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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e., if there are n strategies a
single mutation can result in any strategy with probability 1=n. However, in biological systems it seems natural that not all
mutations can arise from a given state. Certain mutations may be far away, or even be unreachable given the current
composition of an evolving population. These distances between strategies (or genotypes) define a topology of mutations
that so far has been neglected in evolutionary game theory. In this paper we re-evaluate classic results in the evolution of
cooperation departing from the assumption of uniform mutations. We examine two cases: the evolution of reciprocal
strategies in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and the evolution of altruistic punishment in a public goods game. In both
cases, alternative but reasonable mutation kernels shift known results in the direction of less cooperation. We therefore
show that assuming uniform mutations has a substantial impact on the fate of an evolving population. Our results call for a
reassessment of the ‘‘model-less’’ approach to mutations in evolutionary dynamics.
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Introduction
Evolutionary game dynamics can be used to study the evolution
of phenotypes. It usually considers the fate of a population of
strategies playing a game, subject to selection and mutation. In this
framework one of the most studied formalisms is the Moran
process, it allows for studying the interplay between selection and
mutation under demographic noise. The Moran process considers
a finite population of constant size. At every time step one strategy
is chosen for reproduction in proportion to its performance in the
current population. A copy of this strategy is added to the
population after removing a random strategy. With a small
probability, the strategy that is copied changes its type to any of
the other available strategies. This process results in an ergodic
Markov chain. The effect of selection and mutation can be
assessed by inspecting the average composition of the population
in the long run.
The Moran process is often studied in the limit of small
mutation probability [1,2]. A number of key results have been
derived in such a setting, particularly in the literature that
concerns the evolution of cooperation [3–10]. In these studies,
mutations are usually assumed to be uniform, such that any
strategy can mutate to any other with the same probability [11].
Non-uniform mutations arise when these probabilities vary, and
not all states are reachable from a given population, or certain
states are easier to reach than others. Considering such
asymmetries can dramatically change the outcome of evolution
[12]. In this paper, we study how and illustrate it with a few
examples. We find that even if mutations are rare, the structure of
how mutations arise from the different types matters.
Evolutionary processes have been traditionally given two
possible interpretations. In cultural evolution, the process of
selection is taken to represent a situation in which successful
strategies spread by imitation. Here, mutations are generally
interpreted as mistakes in the process of imitating others, or
intended exploration undertaken by individuals [13]. The idea of
non-uniform mutations means in this interpretation, that individ-
uals may be more prone to explore strategies that are less costly to
implement, strategies that imply less risky outcomes, or strategies
that are similar to their previous strategies. Another interpretation
is genetic. Here it would seem natural that not all mutations can
arise from a given state. Certain mutations may be far away, as a
consequence of the complexity of mutation processes and the
(mostly unknown) intricacies of how genes code for different
phenotypes. For our study, we do not need to specify in detail
whether cultural or phenotypic evolution is considered.
Some previous studies have already considered non-uniform
mutation rates. The idea of local mutations is central in adaptive
dynamics, but here the literature is strictly concerned with infinite
populations and continuous strategies in metric spaces [14,15].
Also for evolutionary games in infinite and finite populations with
discrete strategies, general results have been obtained [16–19].
Fudenberg et al. [20] provide a general analysis for 2|2 games in
finite populations under arbitrarily small mutations and non-weak
selection. Imhof and Nowak explore the idea of local mutations in
the continuous strategy space of reactive strategies for direct
reciprocity [21]. Bergin and Lipman [12] argue that mutations
should be specifically modeled, any refinement effect coming from
the uniqueness of a stationary distribution is due to the specific
assumptions made about mutations. Binmore and Samuelson [22]
analyze the effect of different mutation rates in a non-generic
game called the resource game. Their analysis is focused on
deterministic dynamics in infinite populations where the rest
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and Nowak [23] inspect the effect of (different) mutation rates in
average population fitness. None of these studies goes further into
specifying how the different rates of mutation could vary. Here we
introduce a direct comparison between different mutation kernels
in the same game.
We analyze mutation structures in two examples dealing with
the evolution of cooperation. We restrict ourselves to mutation
structures that are non-frequency dependent and do not vary with
time. Our examples resemble the concept of a ‘‘protein space’’, as
envisioned by Maynard Smith [24,25]. Here, phenotypes
(strategies) live in a hypercube and each mutation step represents
a local change in an underlying chain of amino-acids, represented
by strings made up of a finite number of bases. We show that
known results are already drastically called into question when
considering mutation structures beyond the standard case of
uniform mutation rates.
Results
Mutations matter, even when they are rare
Consider the simple case of competition between two strategies
A and B. To study non-uniform mutations, we introduce two
mutation rates: mAB is the probability that an A type mutates into a
B type, and mBA is the probability that a B type turns into an A
type.
The evolutionary dynamics is considerably simplified for small
mutation rates. If mutations are small enough [2], mutants arise
whenever the population has fixated on a strategy, and the
dynamics can be completely characterized by studying a Markov
chain between monomorphic states [3,11]. This transition matrix
is
1{mABrAB mABrAB
mBArBA 1{mBArBA
  
ð1Þ
where rAB is the fixation probability of a single mutant B in a
population of N{1 A’s, and rBA is the fixation probability of
single mutant A in a populations of N{1 B’s. The long-term
dynamics of the system is described by the stationary distribution
1
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This implies that A is more abundant than B in the long run when
mBA
mAB
rBA
rAB
w1 ð3Þ
Let us further specify what
rBA
rAB
looks like. Consider a game with
payoff matrix
AB
A
B
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The expected payoffs when there are j A players in the population
are
pA(j)~a
j{1
N{1
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ð5Þ
pB(j)~c
j
N{1
zd
N{j{1
N{1
: ð6Þ
Following [26], we map payoff to fitness using an exponential
function
fA(j)~exp wpA(j) ½  ð 7Þ
fB(j)~exp wpB(j) ½  ð 8Þ
where w§0 is the intensity of selection. For a standard Moran
process without mutations the fixation ratio is
rAB
rBA
~exp {w
N
2
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N
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where the approximation is valid for large N [27]. With equation
(3), A is more abundant than B in the long run, when
2ln
mBA
mAB
v(azb{c{d)Nw ð10Þ
For mBA~mAB we obtain the usual risk-dominance condition
[28]. But equation 10 implies that it is always possible to choose a
ratio of mutation probabilities, such that any disadvantage in the
game can be reversed by asymmetries in mutations. These
asymmetries only have an effect when selection is not infinitely
strong, wv?. Note that w and N enter linearly, but
mBA
mAB
features
in a logarithmic fashion.
These results hold for any finite intensity of selection and small
(positive) mutations. Even for small mutation rates, the specific
model of how mutations arise can dramatically change the fate of
an evolving population, as shown previously in [20].
Usually, the mutation rate is one single parameter. In larger
systems, studying non-uniform mutation rates requires us to
specify how likely it is that any given strategy i will mutate into any
other possible strategy j. Hence, mutation rates can be defined by
a stochastic matrix K~½mij  such that position i,j specifies what the
probability is to mutate from strategy i into strategy j. We call such
matrix a mutation kernel. Each row of this matrix is normalized
such that
P
j mij~1. Accordingly, completely specifying the
mutation structure requires s(s{1) numbers for a strategy set of
size s.
Let us now look at how such kernels may be specified for
particular examples, and how known results do change when
departing from uniform mutations.
Direct reciprocity: the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
We start by studying the evolution of direct reciprocity [29]. In
the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma defection is the only stable
outcome of the game. Cooperation can be stable, however, if the
game is repeated and the possibility of retaliation exists. This
mechanism is usually referred to as direct reciprocity. As opposed
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many possibilities. We focus on deterministic strategies with a
finite – albeit uncertain – horizon. A strategy for a repeated game
specifies which action to play, given the history of the game so far.
In a repeated game, for any two strategies A and B the payoff of A
when it faces B will be computed as
PAB~ 1{d ðÞ
X ?
i~0
d
ipi
AB, ð11Þ
where d is the continuation probability, and pi
AB is the pay-off in
the i-th round of the game. For convenience we have normalized
the pay-off of the repeated game multiplying by 1{d.
The one shot game we are interested in is a prisoner’s dilemma
with the pay-off matrix (
RS
TP
), with TwRwPwS and
Rw
TzP
2
. The literature on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is
extensive [8,21,30–34]. For instance, Imhof et al. [8], study a
subset of 3 strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), tit-for-tat (TFT)
and always defect (ALLD). Strategies ALLC and ALLD stand for
unconditional cooperation and defection respectively; TFT
cooperates in the first move, and then copies what the opponent
did in the last round. Computing the payoff for this set of
strategies, according to equation (11), yields matrix
RR S
RRS 1{d ðÞ zPd
TT 1{d ðÞ zPd P
0
B B B @
1
C C C A
ð12Þ
A finite population will spend most of the time in the
cooperative strategy TFT, provided a sufficiently large continua-
tion probability [8]. Even though studying this subset of strategies
is insightful, it can be argued that it is a biased subset: in neutrality,
cooperative behaviour is overrepresented because
2
3
’s of the time
are spent in strategies that are completely cooperative. Moreover,
within this subset, it is difficult to come up with mutation kernels
that differ from the uniform one without being completely
arbitrary.
The complete set of strategies for the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma is infinite. Therefore, studying a particular dynamics
implies some restriction in the strategy set. In this section we study
the 8 strategies described in Table 1. This is the deterministic
subset of the strategies considered in [35]; it contains all possible
deterministic strategies that consider the opponent’s last move.
Therefore, a strategy is completely determined by three pieces of
information. The first item determines the action to take on the
first move. The second item is what to do if the opponent
cooperated, and the third one dictates what to do upon the other
defecting. As we will see, this way of conceiving the strategies will
further provide a straightforward alternative mutation structure.
The derivation of the pay-off matrix for all the strategies in
Table 1 is given in Section A of the Supporting Information Text
S1. We compute the abundance in the long run, as described in
the Methods section. That is, we study a Moran process with
exponential fitness mapping in the limit of rare mutations. The
validity of the theoretical prediction here depends on an
appropriate choice of population size (N) and continuation
probability (d), that guarantees that mutations are sufficiently
slower than fixation events. In order to comply with such
requirement we restrict ourselves to large values of d, see Section
B of the Supporting Information Text S1.
Uniform mutations. For the uniform mutation structure, a
mutation occurs with probability m, and all other strategies have
the same chance to be the result of one mutation step. The strategy
chosen for reproduction does not undergo mutation with
probability 1{m. The mutation kernel is thus an 8|8 matrix
with 1{m’s in the diagonal elements, and
m
7 elsewhere. All
strategies are reachable from each other via mutations. Panel A in
Figure 1 shows the results with the standard assumption for
population size n~50. Strategy TFT is by far the winning strategy
in a large region of the parameter space. This is consistent with the
findings in [8]. Unconditional defection is the most popular
strategy only for very strong selection.
Bitwise mutation. We now assume that strategies are
represented by the binary code, as described in Table 1. The
digit 0 stands for cooperation, and the digit 1 stands for defection.
The first digit codes for the initial action, the second digit
determines what to do upon cooperation and the third digit
determines what to do upon defection. This binary representation
is common in disciplines like evolutionary computation [36].
Possible mutations are those between any two strategies that differ
in one bit. Thus, the associated mutation kernel is given by
Kf~
1{m
m
3
m
3
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m
3
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m
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m
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ð13Þ
Any strategy in this kernel has only three neighbors, thus the
mutation matrix is sparse. The structure of selection and mutation
is depicted in Figure 2.
The results are shown in Panel B of Figure 1. Compared to the
case of uniform mutations, the region of the parameter space
where TFT is the most popular strategy has been sharply reduced.
In particular, ALLD is able to beat TFT at a much lower intensity
of selection. In this case, we see that a reasonable mutation kernel
substantially reduces cooperation in the long run. This is
illustrated in Figure 3. Our results are consistent with the findings
of [21], where local mutation reduces the abundance of
cooperative strategies. The main difference with that study is that
we study a finite strategy set in a game that is not indefinitely
repeated, and that our notion of locality naturally stems from the
binary representation of strategies.
The results of the bitwise kernel are of course invariant to
changing the meaning of each position (e.g., the last bit, instead of
the first, determines what to do in the first round), or changing the
meaning of each bit (e.g., cooperation is coded by 1 instead of 0).
Neighborhoods are preserved under any scheme that codes the
strategies in a binary fashion.
Note that arbitrary kernels can produce results that differ in
more radical ways from the standard result with uniform
mutations. For instance, changing the labels by swapping strategies
STFT{1 and NALLD in Figure 2, will cause SALLC to be the most
popular strategy under strong selection. With such a choice,
ð13Þ
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neighbors. The appealing feature of the bitwise kernel is that it
naturally stems from considering a binary representation of the
strategies. As depicted in Figure 3, the idea that direct reciprocity
leads to high levels of cooperation rests on one particular choice of
mutation kernel.
Optional public good games with punishment
We now turn to cooperation without repetition. The evolution
of strategies in the optional public goods game has been studied
extensively since proposed by Fowler [37]. The model considers
four types: cooperators, who invest a given endowment in a joint
enterprise; defectors, who do not invest in the public good but
benefit from it; punishers, who cooperate and in addition punish
those who do not cooperate; and loners, who get a fixed payoff
abstaining from the game. The model has been refined in a series
of papers [3,7,38–40]. The main result for finite populations is that
the system spends a considerable amount of time in cooperative
states. The threat of punishment opens the door for cooperation,
which is stabilized by the option of abstaining. Even though loners
do not have a large share in the stationary distribution, their
presence is essential to maintaining cooperation [3].
Here, we will follow the version of the game presented in [7].
There is a well-mixed finite population of size N. At every time
step, individuals get into groups of size n. Within these groups they
have the option to play a public goods game. Those who
participate can decide wether to invest or not in a joint enterprise,
at a cost c. The total sum of the pot is multiplied by a factor of r,
and divided equally between those who took part in the game.
Loners, i.e., individuals that abstain, get a fixed payoff s. After this
interaction, each contributor can impose a fine b upon each
defector, assuming a cost c for each fine. The expected payoff
follows [7]. As in previous sections, we will inspect abundance in
stationarity for a Moran process with exponential mapping in the
limit of rare mutations.
Uniform mutations. For uniform mutations the systems
spends most of the time in a population completely made up of
cooperators that punish defectors. This can be seen in Figure 4
(panel A), where we show the abundance in stationarity, as a
function of the intensity of selection. Clearly, selection leads to the
prevalence of altruistic punishers.
Analytical results greatly simplify in the limit of strong selection
(i.e., w??), where all the fixation probabilities reduce to 1 , 0,
1=N or 1=2 [7]. In this limit the stationary distribution is given by
(xC,xD,xL,xP)~
1
8zN
(2,2,2,2zN) ð14Þ
Figure 4 (panel B) shows the stationary distribution, as well as
the relative speed of transitions between homogeneous states in the
limit of strong selection. Punishers are vulnerable to invasion via
neutral drift by cooperators, which in turn are susceptible to
invasion of defectors. But loners offer a way out of defection and
back into cooperators or punishers. Thus, via freedom to coercion
[3]. On average, in the long run, altruistic punishers are most
abundant, and cooperation is sustained.
Slower transitions towards sociality. We can depart from
the standard assumption of uniform mutations, for instance,
Table 1. Strategy set in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with one round memory.
Strategy Behavior Binary code
0 ALLC Always cooperate 000
1 TFT Tit for tat 001
2 TFT{1 Cooperate on the first move 010
then reverse the opponent’s last move
3 NALLD Cooperate once and then always defect 011
4 SALLC Defect once and then always cooperate 100
5 STFT Defect once and then copy the opponent’s last move 101
6 STFT{1 Defect once and then reverse the opponent’s last move 110
7 ALLD Always defect 111
For the uniform mutation kernel, it is convenient to number the strategies with integers, for the bitwise kernel binary numbers are more convenient.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.t001
Figure 1. Repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Average abundance in
stationarity. Panel A shows uniform mutations, and Panel B shows the
results for the bitwise kernel. Continuous lines represent the theoretical
approximation. Dots represent simulation results averaged over 500
repetitions of 2|108 generations each, and a mutation probability
m~10{3. Plus signs represent a larger mutation probability, m~10{2.I n
this case of larger m, which is harder to address analytically, the
mutation kernel also affects the average abundance. Values for the
game are R~3:0, S~0:0, T~4:0, P~1:0. The continuation probability
is d~0:99, and population size is n~50.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g001
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are rarer by a factor a[½0,1 . This mutation kernel is given by
matrix Kc.
Kc~
1{m
m
3
m
3
m
3
m
3
1{m
m
3
m
3
am
3
am
3
1{am
am
3
m
3
m
3
m
3
1{m
0
B B B B B B B B @
1
C C C C C C C C A
ð15Þ
We can provide a straightforward interpretation for this
mutational structure, biologically as well as from a cultural
perspective. Biologically, mutations towards strategies that do
actually play the game (C,D,P) could be rarer, since the demands
of social living may require a number of specific mutations to
accumulate before individuals can cope with such demands. On
the other hand, in cultural terms, the factor a could be thought of
as a measure of risk aversion. Given that playing the game is risky,
agents are more hesitant to jump into strategies that carry such
risk. A low a value would mean that loners are less prone to jump
into the game.
In the limit of strong selection the calculations are again greatly
simplified. The stationary distribution is given by:
(xC,xD,xL,xP)~
1
Naz2z6a
2a,2a,2,2azNa ðÞ ð 16Þ
Thus, in the limit of strong selection, playing the game is more
popular than abstaining whenever 6azNaw2.
Figure 5 shows in panel A, the abundance in stationarity as a
function of the intensity of selection. The value of a is 1=50.I n
panel B, we show the transitions and the stationary distribution
using this kernel in the limit of w??. For N??, social
individuals will be more popular for any a. But population size
introduces a limit in which risk averse individuals refrain from
playing the game. The reason is that transitions out of the asocial
state can be considerably slower.
Accordingly, we show that in finite populations some risk
aversion may deter cooperation, as most individuals prefer not to
play the game. This is radically different from what happens in the
case of uniform mutations, where strong selection always leads to
total predominance of altruistic punishers. Other mutation
structures are of course possible, but once again, it is difficult
not to be completely arbitrary. In the next section we inspect a
bitwise mutation kernel for this game.
Bitwise-like mutations in a larger strategy set. A larger
strategy set for the optional public good games with punishment
has been recently studied by Rand and Nowak [6]. In this study,
individuals can contribute to the public good game (C), play
avoiding contribution (D) or abstain from playing (L). In addition,
they can decide wether to punish or not each of the other types. A
strategy is then a 4-tuple ½a1,a2,a3,a4 , where a1~D,C or L, and
a2,a3,a4~P or N. Element a1 codes for contribution or
Figure 2. Repeated prisoner’s dilemma: structure of selection and mutation for bitwise mutation. Arrows indicate the direction of
selection, and dashed lines indicate neutral paths. Blue strategies are completely cooperative and red strategies are completely uncooperative when
paired with themselves. The kernel structure shuts down paths that would normally be available with the standard assumption that all mutation
paths are possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g002
Figure 3. Repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Fraction of time spent
on fully cooperative states in the stationary distribution.
R~3:0, S~0:0, T~4:0, P~1:0. The continuation probability is
d~0:99, population size is N~50, and mutation probability is
m~10{3. Continuous lines are theoretical approximations for small
mutation rates and dots represent simulation results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g003
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determines whether to punish or not defectors, and a4 determines
whether to punish or not loners. The strategy set composed of
3|2|2|2~24 strategies. This strategy set provides the
possibility of antisocial punishment, that is, non-cooperators that
punish cooperators.
The game has the same parameters and structure as the game
considered above; the only difference comes in the specification of
payoffs for each one of the 24 strategies. The formulas are given in
detail in the appendix of [6]. We perform the same type of
analysis, that is, we inspect the stationary distribution that comes
from a Moran process with exponential mapping, in the limit of
rare mutations.
We compare the uniform mutation structure, where all
strategies can be reached from each other with the same weight,
with a bitwise-like kernel that has the following structure. Each
strategies is a chain of four positions. The first position has base 3:
D stands for defection, C stands for cooperation, and L stands for
loner. The second, third and fourth positions are binary. P in the
second position means punish cooperators, whereas N means do
not punish cooperators. The third position takes care of punishing
defectors, and the fourth position codes for punishing loners. In
the bitwise-like kernel, mutations can only take you to a strategy
that differs in one position. This means that each strategy has 5
neighbors as opposed to 23 in the uniform case.
Figure 4. Optional public goods game with uniform mutations. Panel A shows abundance in stationarity as a function of the intensity of
selection. Continuous lines represent the theoretical approximation. Dots represent simulation results averaged over 500 repetitions of 2|108
generations each, and a mutation probability m~10{4. Plus signs represent a larger mutation probability, m~10{3. N~100, n~5, r~3, c~0:3,
b~s~c~1. Panel B shows transitions (Nw) between monomorphic states and abundance as a function of population size in the limit of strong
selection (w??).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g004
Figure 5. Optional public goods game with non-uniform mutations. Panel A shows abundance in stationarity as a function of the intensity of
selection (N~100, n~5, r~3, c~0:3, b~s~c~1) using kernel Kc with a~
1
50
. Continuous lines represent the theoretical approximation. Dots and
plus signs represent simulation results. Panel B shows transitions (Nw) between monomorphic states and abundance as a function of population size,
using kernel Kc, in the limit of strong selection (w??).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g005
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mutate into defectors that punish loners (D-NNP), defectors that
punish other defectors (D-NPN), defectors that punish coopera-
tors (D-PNN), cooperators that do not punish (C-NNN) and
loners that do not punish (L-NNN). Each one of these events
happens with probability
m
5
, and there is no mutation with
probability 1{m.
Figure 6 shows the results of the analysis for both kernels. For
the sake of clarity we exclude self-punishing strategies, whose
frequency in stationarity is very low. Following [6], let us focus
on what happens for intensity of selection equal to 1 (solid vertical
black line). For uniform mutations it is clear that no strategy is
overwhelmingly prevalent. All strategies are below
1
4
. The three
most popular strategies are: C-NPN, L-PNN, and D-NNP. The
system spends more than 60% of the time on these three
strategies. The most popular strategy corresponds to altruistic
punishers, followed by loners that punish defectors, and defectors
that punish loners. It is striking that antisocial punishment is
associated mostly to asocial individuals who abstain from playing
the game.
Introducing the bitwise-like mutation structure we also find
that no strategy is overwhelmingly prevalent. In particular, the
stationary distribution has more variation and other strategies
become abundant. The most popular strategies are now altruistic
punishers, loners that punish cooperators, and individuals that
refrain from taking any action whatsoever. It is noteworthy that
introducing this kernel considerably favors the autarkic option
of individuals that abstain from the game, and forgo any
punishment.
Discussion
We have formalized a Moran process with non-uniform
mutations. We show that mutation structure plays an important
role, even if mutations are assumed to be small. In three examples
we have come up with specific reasonable kernels that overturn
known results. Our mutation kernels are akin to Maynard-Smiths’s
concept of protein spaces, where phenotypes are connected by unit
mutational steps [24,25].
We first study the evolution of direct reciprocity in a set of 8
strategies. Representing strategies as strings of bits, we introduce a
new mutation structure that reduces significantly the amount of
cooperation to be expected in the long run.
Next we turn to a model of cooperation without repetition. We
study the evolution of altruistic punishment in optional public
good games. Assuming a reasonable kernel with a clear biological
and behavioural interpretation leads to the possibility of abstention
being more successful than playing the game. A specific condition
is specifically worked out for the case of strong selection. Finally,
we study optional public good games with punishment in a much
larger strategy space. The structure of the space also lends itself to
an interpretation that makes it easy to come up with a reasonable
mutation kernel. This kernel changes the results in a significant
manner, particularly showing that allowing for so many strategies
can actually result in no play being a very successful alternative.
Even though we have focused our analysis on systems in the
limit of small mutation rates and without population structure,
there is no reason to suspect that the effects we have highlighted
will not be salient as well in systems with larger mutation rates [7],
or with spatial structure [41–46].
Figure 6. Optional public goods game with bitwise-like mutations. Abundance in stationarity as a function of the intensity of selection
(N~100, n~5, r~3, c~0:3, b~s~c~1). Panel A shows results for uniform mutation structure. Panel B shows results for bitwise-like mutations. The
reference intensity of selection (w~1) is marked with a vertical black line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287.g006
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mutations in evolutionary dynamics, where given a strategy set, all
mutations are available an equally likely. Even in the limit of rare
mutations, the mutation structure can make a substantial
difference on what gets selected. It is important to observe that
all models that follow the methodology studied here, rest on a
specific assumption of mutation structure [12]. It is therefore
important, not to just consider what the strategy space is, but also
if there are natural ways to infer a specific topology or
interpretation of the set of strategies in relation to mutations.
Methods
The evolutionary dynamics is studied based on the Moran
process [47]. We consider a finite population of constant size N.A t
every time step, one strategy is chosen for reproduction in
proportion to its performance in the current population. A copy of
this strategy is added to the population after removing a random
strategy. With a small probability, the strategy that is copied
changes its type to any of the other available strategies. If the
strategy selected for reproduction is i, its mutation probability to a
strategy j is given by kij. The probability of mutations are
summarized in a normalized stochastic matrix K~ kij
  
, here
called mutation kernel. The process results in an ergodic Markov
chain [1]. Fitness values are obtained by mapping fitness using an
exponential function fi~ewpi, where pi is the payoff of the game
being considered; and w is the intensity of selection.
We asses the effect of selection and mutation by inspecting the
average composition of the population in the long run. The
stationary distribution can be computed exactly, if mutations are
sufficiently small [1,2]. We have compared the theoretical
predictions to Monte Carlo simulations (symbols in the Figures).
The stationary distribution is estimated by averaging the result of a
sufficient number of runs. Each run is composed of a number of
generations, starting in a random population. The average
composition of the population is computed during a window at
the end of each run.
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